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Oversight of Dual-use Research An Asían Perspectíve



Presentation Layout

- Defining the Problem
- Compare & Contrast: Fink Report
- Epidemics and Asia
- **o** Biotech Industry and Asia
- Safety & Security: Few Asian Cases
- Asian View



"Dual-use" Dilemma

- Civilian facilities could be used for military purposes
- Equipment and agents could be misused
- Terrorists could take advantage of existing BT infrastructure without state knowing it
- Scientific knowledge could reach wrong hands
- Accidental release of 'germs'

The Issue

Modern biological research offers enormous potential to benefit society

- The synergy created by increasing knowledge and open exchange of ideas and information is accelerating the advance of medicine, industry, and agriculture
- <u>The growing risk</u>: New advances could help making novel biological weapons or could be misused by careless groups and individuals



The Indicators

- South Korea scientists conducted experiments to enrich small amounts of uranium (2000)
- Done without official approval
- The very nature of WMD is so secretiveoften governments are unaware about small scale scientific projects
- Experimenting on 'germs': possibility exists



The Difficulty

- The open exchange of scientific data and concepts is need of the hour
- Results of fundamental research should remain unrestricted
- Vaccine development, for example, depends on cutting-edge biomedical research
- Censorship is complicated in 'Web era'
- Publish or Perish???

The Requirement

21st Century threats demand differnet solutions

- Threat could be form non-state or a 'rogue' state
- There is ongoing change in pattern of terror
- Goal of terror today is much beyond media coverage and attention
- To match a balance between openess in 'science' and reticence of 'security' is the challenge

The Need

Coordinated global efforts are needed to reduce this growing risk

Oversight of Dual use research-a need to create templet to resolve this issue

 The templet should take into consideration culture, pracitices, ethics etc. of the region into account

Ensuring Responsible Oversight for BT

- Educating the Scientific Community
- **o Review Plans for Experiments**
- Review at Publication Stage
- Creation of a National Science Advisory Board for Biodefense (NSABB)
- Protection Against Misuse
- Engage Life Sciences in Security
- Harmonize International Oversight

Could Fink Model be superimposed

on Asia-Pacific?

YES and NO



An Asian Scrutiny

- Educating the Scientific Community- is possible and is being done
- Review experiments/publications- may be
- Protection against misuse- *country specific models exist*
- Harmonize International Oversight- agreeable
- Creation of a advisory board for *Biodefense*policies exist
- Engage Life Sciences in Security-*problematic*

Asia the worst sufferers from epidemics in recent past

SARS Bird Flu

SARS

 Between the first description of the disease in November 2002 and July 2003, there were approximately 8,000 probable cases and just fewer than 800 deaths worldwide

 The epidemic cost Asia approximately US\$30 b in terms of losses in tourism and business and in other direct costs

SARS contd

- From August 2003 to November 2004–natural course of infection overseventeen confirmed cases of SARS
- Four from community-acquired (exposures at an animal market)
- Six other cases were laboratory-acquired
- One of the laboratory-acquired infections led to seven additional infections

SARS contd

In none of these cases has it been assumed that there was a profound failure of technology or equipment

- The problem people working with those organisms <u>lacked the training & resources</u>
- Oversight and regulation of any activity is <u>composed of several layers of regulatory</u> <u>frameworks and implementation</u>
- The implementation of such a complex system at multiple levels is the real challenge

Bird Flu

- Principal transmission of the virus occurring among poultry and other birds
- At the overall macroeconomic level, costs so far have been fairly limited, but could rise significantly, SE Asia worst affected region
- A pandemic of avian influenza among humans could cost the global economy US\$800 billion a year- The World Bank Study

BT Industry Asia-Pacific

Growth Rate of > 11% from 2004-06

- Expected value of market by 2006 > US\$ 39.16 b
- Japan, China, and Taiwan largest growing markets (presently has 76% market share)
- Likely to emerge as a key destination for clinical trials & stem cell research
- Major growth in agriculture sectordeveloping large number of GM crops

BT Industry Asia-Pacific contd

- Biopharma industry will emerge as a major segment
- Industry is largely dependent on the government, little private participation in most of the countries
- The Contract Research industry in India could reach as high as US\$ 270 m by 2009
- In few cases opaque government policies and regulations

Indian Biotech Industry

- Growth rate of 28.09% from the year 2005
- Expected turnover US\$ 5 b by the end of 2010
- Key destination for clinical trials & stem cell research
- Important role in Agriculture sector by developing large number of GM crops
- BioPharma industry, comprising of vaccines, therapeutics and other products, will emerge as major segment





& Oversight of Dual-use Research

India's diktat to fight Disease Spread § BW Proliferation

India has in place

A regulatory mechanism for the maintenance of security and oversight of pathogens, micro-organisms, genetically modified organisms and toxins in production, import, export, use and research

Measures Taken by India

- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986-Procedures and Safeguards for handling of 'Hazardous Substances'
- 1989 Rules- hazardous microorganisms & gene tech
- 1990 Recombinant DNA Safety Guidelines (RDAC)
- Need for Institute Bio-safety committee (IBSC) for any lab

Biosafety regulatory framework

1989 Rules are elaborated & revised time to time

- 1994: Revised guidelines for safety in biotechnology
- 1998: Guidelines for research in Transgenic Plants, Toxicity, Evaluation of Transgenic seeds, plants



- Various guidelines list microorganisms on the basis of differential risk assessment
- Category 2 of SCOMET list (duel-use export control)

Advisory & regulatory bodies

- Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation (RCGM)
- Genetic Engineering Approval Committee (GEAC)
- Coordination is done by DoB

Code of Conduct

- ICMR has developed CoC for scientists engaged in biomedical research, 2000
- In consistence with the 1964 Helsinki declaration later amended in 2000 based on principles of autonomy, privacy, justice and equity



• The drug policy, 2002

• National Seeds Policy, 2002

• Ethical Policies on the Human Genome, Genetic Research and Services, 2002

WMDs Bill 2005

WMD proliferation is a criminal offence

- Prevent manufacture, export, transfer, transit and transshipment of WMD material, equipment, technology and their means of delivery
- Penalties carry jail terms from five years to life imprisonment along with fines
- Companies are also liable for prosecution



Safety Rules: China

- The Chinese regulations are drawn from the "best practices" of international biosafety and biosecurity regulations
- All rules and regulations at par with global standards

China and BT Industry

- China has a large and rapidly growing biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry
- More than 500 enterprises associated with life science and biotechnology with 50,000 employees

Philippines

- The first Philippine anti-terrorism bill was proposed on 19 January 1996 and passed its own anti-terrorism law on 06 March 2007
- National Committee on National Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) —established in 1990 *first* BIOTECH regulatory system in ASEAN Region

Biosafety: Philippines

- Institutional Biosafety Committee and Technical Committee and Technical Review Panel at place
- Draft guidelines to ensure that experiments using GMOs do not pose unacceptable risks to human health and the environment

Sri Lanka & Biosafety

- Has established a national biosafety framework but it essentially deals with genetically modified organisms
- 15 universities and 50 research institutes deal with BT
- Safety guidelines are by individual laboratories
- Biosafety and biosecurity regulations do not exist
- Lack legal framework



Asia & Causes of Disease Spread

- Globalization
- Modern Medical Practices
- **o** Urbanization
- Environmental Factors
- Change in social and behavioral patterns



Problem Areas

- The number of people who could possibly understand regulations and implement them at a policy level is probably quite small
- The number of people technically trained to implement them is even smaller
- Specific guidelines for oversight on dual use Biotech Research required in few cases



Is Asia Having a Separate View?

• Not really

- BT is still in a developing stage than many other countries
- Good practices exit but may not have reached to the grass-root level
- Lack Training / Infrastructure could be a problem in certain cases



Image Asia

- Mixed picture
- Traditional spread of disease represents a security challenge-states have different views
- Need to understand the security dimension in contemporary 'microbial era'
- Multilateral forums like ASEAN, ARF, APEC have started routinely focusing on BT threat
- Security & Intelligence establishments are inherently conservative
- States not ready to look beyond narrow focus on BW

We must recognize.....

The biotechnology safety guidelines could never be one time exercise as knowledge is ever expanding



THANK YOU